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Abstract 
Over the past decades, an evolving global debate was held, whether the public utilities should be owned and operated by 
government or private companies. In this paper, we researched if the type of corporate ownership affects the operation of market 
utilities in Greek telecommunications market. Specifically, we used a panel dataset that includes the pricing policy of services in 
telephony (fixed and mobile) and Internet, and examined whether this differs between private and government-owned 
corporations. The data were collected by 44 of the most important telecommunication companies - fixed and mobile telephony, 
and Internet - during the period 1993-2008. The method of interviews has been used for obtaining data and descriptive statistics 
used for their evaluation, using SPSS. A little difference between public and private systems of service pricing was found. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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The postwar period was marked by a world system of economic organization that has a focus on increasing state 
ownership against the theory of the free market. The main argument of the public sector’s expansion was that it 
would be impossible to promote the development process without the existence of education  and  healthcare or the 
assurance of the energy infrastructure, transport  and  communications  and  water supply. Only the government was 
able to take over these utilities, according to the prevailing view (Shirley, & Walsh, 2000; Rondinelli, & Iacono, 
1996; Shleifer, 1998; Errunza, & Mazumdar, 2001; Taylor, & Warrack, 1998). 
However, the above theory of public ownership was strongly contested in favor of private ownership at the early 
80’s. The first modern privatization programs initiated in UK and the successful initial public offering of British 
Telecom in 1984 was the most important (Lal, et. al 2004; Parker, 2003; Yergin, & Stanislaw, 1998; Puxty, 1997; 
Eckel, et.al. 1997; Menyah, & Paudyal, 1996; Menyah, et.al 1995; Vickers, &Yarrow, 1991). The success of the 
privatization program in Britain prompted a numerous of developed and developing countries to adopt similar 
programs, selling the government-owned corporations to private sector (Alexandre, & Charreaux, 2004; Ricketts, 
2004; OECD, 2003; Sztyber, 2003; Hanousek, & Kocenda, 2003; Tchipev, 2003; Brainerd, 2002; Earle, &Telegdy, 
2002; Pelozo, 2001; Dumontier, & Laurin, 2002; Estache, et.al 2001). 
 In comparison of public and private ownership, there is a significant number of empirical  studies examining 
whether the private companies operate more efficiently than the government-owned corporations. The results are 
ambiguous. In particular, many authors (Claessens, & Djankov, 2002; LaPorta, et.al 2000a; Dewenter, & Malatesta, 
2001, Frydman, et.al 1997; Majumdar, 1996; Ehrlich, at.al 1994; Vining, & Boardman, 1992, Boardman, & Vining, 
1989) conclude that the private companies are more efficient and more profitable than the public-owned companies 
and thus provide better services to the people, in spite of the lack of sufficient data. 
Contrary to the above, Omran (2004), that examined 108 Egyptian firms (38 fully  privatized, 16 partially 
privatized and 54 public-owned companies), found no significant difference in improving the performance of 
privatized firms compared to public-owned companies. This is attributed to the fact that the improvement of the 
performance of privatized firms affects positive the performance of public-owned companies due to competition. 
Estache & Rossi (2002) provide further evidence on the difference between public and private utilities estimating a 
stochastic cost frontier for a sample of Asian and Pacific regional water companies. The results show that efficiency 
is not significantly different between private and public utilities. The sample covers 50 firms surveyed in 1995 in 19 
countries. Saal & Parker (2001) evaluate the productivity and price performance for the privatized water and 
sewerage companies of England and Wales. Estimates of productivity growth, derived with quality adjusted output 
indices, suggest that despite reductions in labor usage, total factor productivity growth has not improved since 
privatization. Furthermore, total price performance indices reveal that increases in output price have outstripped 
increases in input costs, a trend which is largely responsible for the increase in economic profits that has occurred 
since privatization. Similarly, Martin & Parker (1995), examining the performance of 11 companies in Great Britain 
which were privatized during the 1980s, found that private ownership is not categorically efficient than public 
ownership. 
In Greece, one of the first industries fully released in competition with the gradual privatization of National 
Organization and entering new private firms was the telecommunications sector. The gradual opening up to 
competition of Greek market since 1992 encouraged and facilitated the growth of numerous new companies. From a 
single public company active in 1992, the telecommunication companies in the three main services’ categories 
amounted to more than 350 in 2008, as evidenced by Register of Operators of Hellenic Telecommunication and Post 
Commission1. Four companies were already licensed to provide mobile telephony services in the market. In 1992, 
was set out a duopoly policy which encouraged two private telecommunications companies to enter the market. Six 
years later, in 1998 entered the market, the National Telecommunications Organization through a subsidiary 
company and became the 3rd telecommunications service company. Finally, a fourth company was licensed in 2002, 
adding further to competition in the market. 
In this paper, we investigate whether the type of corporate ownership affects the operation of utilities in Greek 
telecommunications market. In particular, we investigate whether the ownership affected the pricing of services in 
 
 
1However, it is important to note that in fact the real active companies in the market were less than the counted number of companies by Register 
of Operators of Hellenic Telecommunication and Post Commission.
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fixed telephony (monthly fixed charge, local calls, long distance calls, international calls and calls to mobile), the 
mobile telephony (monthly fixed charge of cheaper program, minimum charge from mobile phone to mobile phone 
and sending an SMS), and Internet (monthly fixed charge, Usage rental per peak hour and annual standard 
subscription connection PSTN 56k. For this reason, in this research the companies are divided into public and 
private companies. As public companies characterized the companies, the majority of which are state-owned, along 
with their administrations, which appointed by the government. On the contrary, private companies are companies 
belonging exclusively to individuals. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
This research focused on the activity carried out by companies in the Greek telecommunications market which 
providing services as fixed and mobile telephony, as well as Internet services, which were included in the relevant 
Register of Operators of Hellenic Telecommunication and Post Commission. Eventually, we identified a total 
population of 108 companies providing basic telecommunications services (fixed and mobile telephony and 
Internet) through the Register of Operators. 
In order to draw primary information (see Appendix), the companies examined by means of interviews with the 
help of a questionnaire. The information were concerning inter alia, the ownership and pricing policy of these 
companies. Primary research was conducted during (in) four phases. During the first phase, the questionnaire was 
edited and improved with the help of a pilot interview.  During the second phase, firstly a telephone contact was 
made with each individual company in this field and was followed by the questionnaire which was sent by e-mail. 
During the third phase, the telephone contact was resumed in order to finalize the meetings with the competent 
company executives.  During the fourth phase in 2010 was confirmed the service pricing for the reporting period via 
phone. Finally, 44 companies (41%) took part in the research with a market share of over 95% for the sub-sector of 
fixed telephony and Internet and 100% for the mobile telephony. The reliability degree of the sample is considered 
high; likewise the information quality, which resulted from interviews with top management, marketing, public 
relations’ and personnel’s executives. 
Of the 44 companies in the sample, the 3 was public, of which two were providing fixed telephony and Internet 
services and the third operator only mobile telephony services.  The remaining 41 were private companies, of which 
38 were active in the sub-sector of fixed telephony and Internet and three in the sub-sector of mobile telephony. The 
reference period was in effect from 1993 up to 2008. In 2009, the National Telecommunications Organization was 
fully privatized after the sale of a majority stake in a private company. Since then, all the companies who provide 
telecommunication services in the Greek market are private. 
 
3. Pricing Policy 
 
In Greece, the applied pricing policy  to voice and data services before the full liberalization of market, is 
confined only to the pricing of provided services from National Telecommunication Organization and essentially 
determined by the respective governments. Therefore, every year the government in the context of overall economic 
and fiscal policy implemented major tariff rebalancing in the provided services with the agreement of relevant 
authorities of the National Telecommunication Organization. The main criteria taken into account in determining the 
tariffs of telecommunication services were: 
• the nature of the National Telecommunication Organization as Utilities, 
• the changes in the Consumer price index, 
• the development plan of National Telecommunication Organization, 
• the budget shortfall and financing of the Post which was imposed by law to covered by the National 
Telecommunication Organization 
By the fully liberalization of the telecommunication market and the entrance of new companies in the local 
loop, increased the needs for ensure healthy effective competition and to provide adequate consumer information. 
This created an urgent need for reform of the regulatory framework concerning the pricing policy fixing of the 
provided services. In this direction, in 2003 was adopted a new Regulation (Decision 277/64/2003 of Hellenic 
Telecommunication and Post Commission), with which was established the approval process for retail and 
wholesale prices of the provided services subject to cost orientation obligation (such as monthly fixed charge, local 
and long distance charges, charges for leased lines etc), as well as the approval process for deals and discount 
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packages, which influenced the pricing policy. In contrast, the pricing policy of the mobile telephony services 
reflected the competition prevailing in market and consequently two new companies were licensed immediately to 
provide services in the market. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Fixed Telephony 

It is obvious from this research that the charge for local calls is lower (0,024€) in private companies than the 
public company (0,026€). The highest difference is observed in the charge of long distance calls, where in the 
private companies in the same year (2008), the charge was for 1 minute  0,047 € and in the public company was 
0,062€. Furthermore, the private companies charge for international calls significantly lower than the public 
company. Besides this, the costs of calls to mobile was lower for the private companies (0,181 €) compared with the 
public company (0,192€). The monthly fixed charge is exactly the same for the public company and private 
companies until 2008, since a robust nationwide telecommunications network provided only by the National 
Telecommunication Organization. Therefore, the new companies in order to provide their services were required to 
lease lines from National Telecommunication Organization. The higher charges observed in the public company 
may be due to the significantly more staff which consequently results in increased operating costs, as it appeared 
(Table 1). 
Table 1. Fixed telephony‘s price development (in €-cents, VAT is excluded) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=Public Company, 2= Private Companies  
(Source: data research) 
 
4.2 Mobile Telephony 
 
As it concerns the mobile telephony services, showed that in the public company the monthly fixed charge in 
2008 was lower 3,17 € (7,33€) than in private companies (10,50€). In contrast, the minimum charge and sending an 
SMS is cheaper in private companies than the public company. Specifically, in the private companies the minimum 
charge in 2008, was 0,0036€ and the cost of sending an SMS  was 0,0820 €, while in the public company was 
0,0040€ and 0,085 € respectively (Table 2). 
Table 2. Mobile telephony‘s price development (in €-cents, VAT is excluded) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Fixed charge (Monthly)(1) 9,98 10,49 11,40 11,90 11,90 11,90 11,90 
Fixed charge (Monthly)(2) 9,98 10,49 11,40 11,90 11,90 11,90 11,90 
Local calls (1 minute)(1) 0,026 0,026 0,026 0,026 0,026 0,026 0,026 
Local calls (1 minute)(2) 0,024 0,024 0,024 0,024 0,024 0,024 0,024 
Long distance calls (1 minute)(1) 0,063 0,063 0,063 0,062 0,062 0,062 0,062 
Long distance calls (1 minute)(2) 0,048 0,049 0,047 0,047 0,047 0,047 0,047 
International calls (1 minute)(e.g  EU country) (1) 0,246 0,246 0,246 0,246 0,246 0,246 0,246 
International calls (1 minute)(e.g  EU country) (2) 0,173 0,174 0,172 0,160 0,160 0,160 0,160 
Calls to mobile (1 minute)(1) 0,268 0,268 0,268 0,192 0,192 0,192 0,192 
Calls to mobile (1 minute)(2) 0,208 0,215 0,202 0,181 0,181 0,181 0,181 
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 Monthly fixed charge (1) 
Monthly fixed 
charge (2) 
Minimum 
charge (1 
second) (1) 
Minimum 
charge (1 
second) (2) 
1 SMS (1) 1 SMS (2) 
1993 - 27,88 - 0,1567 - - 
1994 - 27,88 - 0,1644 - - 
1995 - 27,88 - 0,1703 - - 
1996 - 22,75 - 0,2099 - 0,079 
1997 - 18,34 - 0,1805 - 0,079 
1998 - 13,21 - 0,0041 - 0,078 
1999 7,33 12,47 0,0041 0,0060 0,085 0,081 
2000 7,33 8,36 0,0041 0,0044 0,085 0,084 
2001 7,33 7,92 0,0041 0,0044 0,085 0,082 
2002 7,33 7,92 0,0041 0,0044 0,085 0,085 
2003 7,33 10,50 0,0035 0,0041 0,085 0,080 
2004 7,33 10,50 0,0035 0,0041 0,085 0,080 
2005 7,33 10,50 0,0040 0,0036 0,085 0,082 
2006 7,33 10,50 0,0040 0,0036 0,085 0,082 
2007 7,33 10,50 0,0040 0,0036 0,085 0,082 
2008 7,33 10,50 0,0040 0,0036 0,085 0,082 
1=Public Company, 2= Private Companies  
(Source: data research) 
 
4.3 Internet 
 
For the Internet, as is clear from the analysis of the data, the monthly fixed charge as the usage rental per pick 
hour was the same for the public company and for private companies. 
 Marginal difference is observed only in annual standard subscription, with the charge be in 2008 10,28€ for the 
public company  and 10,35 € for private companies. This conclusion is confirmed also by the results of existing 
research. In particular, both the Wallsten (2001) and the Nicoletti (2001) and Boyland & Nicoletti (2000) found no 
clear relationship of ownership to the pricing of Internet services (Table 3). 
Table 3. Internet price development (in €-cents, VAT is excluded) 
1=Public Company, 2= Private Companies  
(Source: data research) 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this article, we have investigated whether the type of corporate ownership affects the operation of the Greek 
telecommunications market, as expressed by the pricing policy of service in fixed, mobile telephony and Internet. In 
order to achieve this, we conducted an empirical research in 44 of the most prominent companies of the 
telecommunications sector in Greece, which according to the ownership divided into public and private companies. 
We gathered data for period 1993-2008 and we evaluated these data descriptively using SPSS statistics packages. 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Monthly fixed 
charge (1) 6,02 6,75 6,75 8,22 9,98 10,49 11,40 11,90 11,90 11,90 11,90 
 
Monthly fixed 
charge (2) 
6,02 6,75 6,75 8,22 9,98 10,49 11,40 11,90 11,90 11,90 11,90 
Usage rental (per 
peak hour) ( 1) 0,458  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352 0,352 
 
Usage rental (per 
peak hour) (2)  
0,458  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352  0,352 0,352 
Annual standard 
subscription 
(PSTN 56k) (1) 
17,17 16,79 14,67 14,67 14,63 14,63 12,00 10,28 10,28 10,28 10,28 
 
Annual standard 
subscription 
(PSTN 56k) (2) 
13,23 13,23 11,50 13,27 13,15 10,94 10,53 10,35 10,35 10,35 10,35 
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Our descriptive results, which are supported also by other researchers (Wallsten, & Kosec, 2005; Saal, & Parker, 
2001; Wallsten, 2001; Nicoletti, 2001; Boyland, & Nicoletti, 2000) shown that there is no clear relationship of 
ownership with the pricing of provided services. Especially, the results of this research are equivocal; as that found 
in the charge of fixed telephony calls which is higher than in public companies. In contrast, as it concerns the mobile 
telephony services, we concluded that the rates are lower in public companies than in private companies, with the 
exception of sending an SMS, which is cheaper to private companies. About the prices of Internet marginal 
difference observed only in annual standard subscription, where public companies are cheaper. In this way, the 
present work offers useful information about a field that continues to be characterized by a vast researching deficit. 
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Appendix: Research Questionnaire 
Table 1. Fixed telephony‘s price development (in €-cents, VAT is excluded) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Mobile telephony‘s price development (in €-cents, VAT is excluded) 
 Monthly fixed charge  Minimum charge (1 second) 1 SMS 
1993    
1994    
1995    
1996    
1997    
1998    
1999    
2000    
2001    
2002    
2003    
2004    
2005    
2006    
2007    
2008    
 
Table 3. Internet price development (in €-cents, VAT is excluded) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Fixed charge (Monthly)(        
Local calls (1 minute)        
Long distance calls (1 minute)        
International calls (1 minute)(e.g  EU country)         
Calls to mobile (1 minute)        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Monthly fixed 
charge             
Usage rental (per 
peak hour /non 
peak hour)(1) 
           
Annual standard 
subscription 
(PSTN 56k) 
           
